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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
During the survey period the major cases dealing with envi-
ronmental law arose under one or both of two environmental stat-
utes. This Article will first discuss the cases which arose under the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.' The second section of
the Article will survey the cases decided under the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972.'
I. NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT
The purpose of the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969 (NEPA)5 was to declare a national environmental policy and
to establish the Council on Environmental Quality.' This Act re-
quires federal agencies to consider and respect environmental is-
sues and prescribes the procedures that must be followed by the
agencies in order to assure full environmental consideration.5 The
most significant requirement contained in the Act is that federal
agencies prepare environmental impact statements (EIS) whenever
major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment are proposed.6
The role of a court in reviewing the EIS is strictly limited.
Once an agency has made a decision subject to NEPA's procedural
requirements, the court is only to ensure that the agency has con-
1. 42 U.S.C. §9 4321-4361 (1976).
2. 33 U.S.C. §9 1251-1376 (1976).
3. 42 U.S.C. 99 4321-4361 (1976).
4. Id. § 4321.
5. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n,
449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1976). The contents of the EIS are to include a discussion of the
following:
(i) [T]he environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the propo-
sal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the
maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be
involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
Id. § 4332(2)(C)(i)-(v).
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sidered the environmental consequences. 7 The court must deter-
mine whether the environmental group has established by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that the EIS was inadequate.8 In 1978
the Fifth Circuit set forth three criteria for determining the ade-
quacy of an EIS: (1) Whether the agency in good faith has objec-
tively taken a hard look at the environmental consequences of a
proposed action and alternatives to that action; (2) whether the
EIS provides detail sufficient to allow those who did not partici-
pate in its preparation to understand and consider the pertinent
environmental influences involved; and (3) whether the EIS expla-
nation of alternatives is sufficient to permit a reasoned choice
among different courses of action.9 In reaching its decisions, the
court applied these criteria liberally and upheld every EIS that it
considered.
A. Adequacy of the EIS
The first case of the survey period dealing with the adequacy
of an EIS was South Louisiana Environmental Council, Inc. v.
Sand.10 An environmental group sought injunctive relief against
the United States Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) to halt con-
struction on a navigation project in Louisiana. The Corps had pre-
pared an EIS and a supplement to the EIS, but the plaintiffs al-
leged that the Corps had given a distorted assessment of economic
benefits and environmental costs. The economic benefits were al-
legedly overstated because of the inclusion of invalid hurricane ref-
uge and flood control benefits and the miscalculation of other navi-
gation benefits. The costs of the project were underestimated,
according to plaintiffs, because of the Corps' failure to consider in-
creased costs in view of a levee-extension-flood-control proposal.
Plaintiffs claimed further that the Corps had underestimated costs
by "fail[ing] to consider adequately the project's water quality im-
7. Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227 (1980) (per
curiam).
8. Sierra Club v. Morton, 510 F.2d 813, 818 (5th Cir. 1975).
9. Save Our Sycamore v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 576 F.2d 573, 575
(5th Cir. 1978).
10. 629 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir. Oct. 1980). The plaintiffs also contended that the Corps of
Engineers' approval of the project was invalid under a provision of the Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1976). This issue is discussed in part II of this Survey,
notes 76-78 infra, and accompanying text.
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pacts, impacts of economic and population growth in the project
area, impacts on land loss, and alternatives to the project.""
In order to determine whether the Corps had taken a "hard
look" at these environmental impacts, the court also had to decide
whether the economic factors against which the environmental
considerations were weighed were so distorted that fair judgment
was impaired. After reviewing each of the challenged economic
benefits, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the Corps had indeed
taken the required "hard look" at the environmental consequences
of the project."2 The court refused to inspect the Corps' economic-
benefit analysis as closely as the plaintiffs had requested, because
such projects have very long gestation periods and economic reali-
ties change."3 The court stated that once the decision has been
made to proceed with a project, the court will not substitute its
judgment for that of Congress and the Corps unless the decision
was arbitrary and capricious."
In Citizens for Mass Transit, Inc. v. Adams," the court up-
held another environmental impact statement attacked by citizens'
groups. In this .case the project was a proposed bridge across the
Mississippi River near New Orleans, and the agency involved was
the United States Coast Guard. The citizens' groups contended
that the EIS analysis was insufficiently detailed and that the com-
bination of alleged misstatements and inadequacies in the EIS
presented a pattern of bad faith on the part of the Coast Guard.'
Not only did the court consider the analysis to have been made in
good faith, but it also found the report careful and detailed.17 The
Fifth Circuit thus affirmed the district court's summary judgment
for the defendant Coast Guard.
The environmentalists lost again in Sierra Club v. Hassell,'8 a
case in which the federal agencies prepared no EIS at all. The
agencies involved, the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA)
and the Coast Guard, determined that an EIS was not required
because the project was not a major action having a significant im-
11. 629 F.2d at 1010.
12. Id. at 1012.
13. Id. at 1014-15.
14. Id. at 1011.
15. 630 F.2d 309 (5th Cir. Nov. 1980).
16. Id. at 312-13.
17. Id. at 317.
18. 636 F.2d 1095 (5th Cir. Feb. 1981).
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pact on the environment.19 The project was the construction of a
bridge between Dauphin Island and the Alabama mainland to re-
place a bridge destroyed in 1979 by Hurricane Frederic. The
FHWA argued that the status quo of the environment was the
bridge in place, prior to its destruction; thus, the project to rebuild
the bridge would have no significant impact on the environment.20
The plaintiff environmental groups contended that the status quo
was the island after the hurricane, without a bridge.2 1 The Fifth
Circuit, however, found that the FHWA's conclusions were reason-
able and upheld the decision not to prepare an EIS, because re-
building the bridge would merely restore an environmental situa-
tion that had existed for twenty-four years, and the new design of
the bridge might even provide some environmental and safety ben-
efits.22 Thus, the circuit court affirmed the district court's denial of
an injunction against the project."8
The environmentalists finally avoided a unanimously adverse
decision in Piedmont Heights Civic Club, Inc. v. Moreland," but
the Fifth Circuit still upheld the challenged EIS. The court af-
firmed the decision of the district court not to grant a preliminary
injunction against the construction of several projects to widen in-
terstate highways in and around Atlanta, Georgia2 5 The majority
held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding
that the plaintiffs had not proved likelihood of success on the mer-
its and, thus, were not entitled to injunctive relief.2u
The environmentalists attacked the EIS on these projects on
two primary grounds. First, the plaintiffs argued that the federal
agencies involved had failed to comply with the NEPA because the
EIS did not consider the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Au-
thority (MARTA) rail system as an alternative to the highway ex-
19. Id. at 1097.
20. Id. at 1099.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1101.
24. 637 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. Feb. 1981).
25. Id. at 433.
26. Id. The four requirements for granting a preliminary injunction are the following:
(1) A substantial likelihood exists that plaintiff will prevail on the merits; (2) a substantial
threat exists that plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted; (3)
the threatened injury to plaintiff outweighs the threatened harm the injunction may do to
the defendant; and (4) granting the preliminary injunction will not disserve the public inter-
est. Id. at 435 (citing Canal Auth. v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 572 (5th Cir. 1974)).
[Vol. 13:489492
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pansion projects as required by NEPA2 7 The district judge found
that the MARTA alternative had been adequately covered when
the EIS discussed the "no action" alternative." The Fifth Circuit
held that this finding was not an abuse of discretion, although an
explicit discussion of MARTA might have been instructive.
2
1 It
was apparent to the court that the plans for MARTA had been
considered from the beginning of the decision-making process."0
Judge Thomas A. Clark, in dissent, disagreed that consideration of
the rapid transit alternative could be inferred from a discussion of
the "no-build" alternative.8 1
The other principal ground for the plaintiffs' attack on the
EIS was the alleged improper segmentation of the highway
projects.2 As a general rule segmentation of highway projects is
improper for purposes of preparing an EIS." There are exceptions
to the rule, however, and the court has considered several factors,
including the independent utility of the project and the interde-
pendence of several projects. The Fifth Circuit upheld the trial
court's finding that each segment of the project could serve its own
transportation purpose whether or not the other projects were
built." Thus, it was not an abuse of discretion to hold that the
plaintiffs had not proved the likelihood of success on the merits of
the segmentation issue.8 6
The standard of review for the adequacy of an EIS was
demonstrated clearly in Isle of Hope Historical Association v.
United States Army Corps of Engineers.37 The Fifth Circuit
adopted the trial court's memorandum as its opinion and judged
compliance with NEPA by a "rule of reason," but was careful not
to place extreme or unrealistic burdens on the agency compiling
27. 637 F.2d at 435. The applicable section of the NEPA is 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(iii)
(1976).
28. 637 F.2d at 437.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 444 (dissenting opinion).
32. Id. at 439. Segmentation is the preparation of impact statements on several sec-
tions of a project rather than preparing only one impact statement for the entire project.
33. Id. (citing Sierra Club v. Callaway, 499 F.2d 982 (5th Cir. 1974)).
34. 637 F.2d at 439 (citing Save Our Sycamore v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit
Auth., 576 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1978)).
35. 637 F.2d at 440-41.
36. Id. at 439.
37. 646 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. May 1981).
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the EIS.3" Thus, the environmentalists lost another one.
It is apparent from these cases that the Fifth Circuit is not an
environmentalist court. The court upheld every EIS that was at-
tacked by citizens' groups during the survey period, and the court
once upheld a decision by a federal agency not to prepare an EIS
at all. Obviously, environmentalist groups face a very heavy burden
if they are to succeed in stopping a federal project that threatens
the environment.
B. Private Right of Action
There is no implied right of action under NEPA, according to
the Fifth Circuit in Noe v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit
Authority.3 9 Mrs. Noe lived and operated a bookstore in an apart-
ment building near a Transit Authority (MARTA) construction
site. Because of the physical presence of the construction site and
the high noise levels, Mrs. Noe sought injunctive and declaratory
relief and money damages.4 She filed suit in federal court under
NEPA, alleging that the defendants were exceeding the noise levels
predicted by the EIS.41
The issue of an implied private right of action under NEPA
was a question of first impression for the Fifth Circuit,'2 but two
other circuit courts had considered the issue, 43 and the general
question of implied rights of action had been extensively treated
by the Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit." The Fifth Circuit
applied the four factors set out by the Supreme Court in Cort v.
Ash 4 5 and found that plaintiff had failed to satisfy any of them.
38. Id. at 220 (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 510 F.2d 813, 819 (5th Cir. 1975)).
39. 644 F.2d 434 (5th Cir. May 1981).
40. Id. at 435.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 436.
43. Id. (citing Mountain Brook Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Adams, 620 F.2d 294 (4th
Cir. 1980) (mem.); Blue Ash v. McLucas, 596 F.2d 709 (6th Cir. 1979)).
44. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979); Touche Ross &
Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979);
Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975); Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d 1074 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 889 (1980).
45. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). Four questions must be answered: (1) Is the plaintiff a member
of the class for whose special benefit the statute was created? (2) Is there any indication of
legislative intent either to create or to deny the remedy sought? (3) Is it consistent with the
underlying statutory purposes to imply a remedy such as that sought? and (4) Is the cause
of action one that is traditionally relegated to state law, so that it would be inappropriate to
[Vol. 13:489494
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Thus, if the plaintiff could not prove her right to prevail under the
Cort analysis, she certainly could not succeed under the stricter
standards of the more recent Supreme Court cases, which focus on
legislative intent.46 The Fifth Circuit found that the congressional
intent behind the NEPA did not include the protection of private
individuals.47 The "NEPA does not even require the protection of
the environment," according to the court.48 The NEPA requires
only that an EIS be prepared prior to beginning construction of a
project likely to affect the environment, in order that the individu-
als responsible for making the decision to proceed can do so on a
well-informed basis. 49 Therefore, the court affirmed the district
court's dismissal of Mrs. Noe's suit for want of jurisdiction.
Considering the lack of success that environmentalist groups
have had against federal projects, it hardly matters that there is no
implied private right of action. Nevertheless, the holding in Noe
stands as an additional hurdle for the private party seeking to pro-
tect the environment.
II. FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT
During the survey period, the Fifth Circuit decided a number
of cases involving the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972 (FWPCA)8 0 "The objective of [the FWPCA]
is to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological
integrity of the Nation's waters."' 5 The Act seeks to regulate the
maximum concentration of pollutants in a body of water and the
effluents discharged from any particular source. The cases arising
under the FWPCA during the survey involved several diverse
infer a cause of action based solely on federal law? Id. at 78.
46. In Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979), the Supreme Court found
the first two Cort factors unsatisfied and, thus, refused to consider the others. Since the
latter two factors are generally easier for plaintiff to establish, this holding results in a
stricter standard. Later, in Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11
(1979), the Court based its decision entirely on the second Cort factor, legislative intent.
The trend has been to restrict those situations in which private rights of action will be
implied.
47. 644 F.2d at 438.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976). The Act was significantly amended in 1977, and its
popular name was changed to the "Clean Water Act." Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No.
95-217, §§ 1, 518, 91 Stat. 1566, 1566 (1977) (amending scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.).
51. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1976).
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issues.
A. "Third Party"
The FWPCA imposes liability for cleanup costs upon the own-
er or operator of any vessel from which oil or a hazardous sub-
stance is illegally discharged.52 The owner-operator is provided a
defense if he can prove that the discharge was caused solely by an
act of God, an act of war, negligence on the part of the United
States Government, an act or omission of a third party, or any
combination of these causes.5 8 Decisions in two of the cases turned
upon the court's definition of the term "third party." In United
States v. LeBeouf Brothers Towing Co.5 and in United States v.
Hollywood Marine, Inc.,55 the Government sought to hold the
owner of tanker barges liable for oil spills caused by the tugboats,
which were towing the barges. In both cases the trial court held for
the defendants on the grounds that the tugboats constituted a
"third party" under the FWPCA and, thus, insulated the barge
owner from liability.56 In LeBeouf the Fifth Circuit followed the
reasoning of the First Circuit, in Burgess v. MIV Tamano,57 and
interpreted the term narrowly because "[t]he statute's comprehen-
sive scheme for preventing and cleaning up oil spills would be un-
dermined if barge owners . . . could escape strict liability merely
by hiring out their operations to tugs and independent contrac-
tors."" Consequently, the court held that the tugboat hired by a
barge owner is not a "third party" under the FWPCA.. In
Hollywood Marine the court followed LeBeouf in summarily re-
versing the trial court's judgment and remanding the case.60 These
cases should cause barge owners to select their tugs carefully and
insure against potential losses.6
52. Id. § 1321(f)(1).
53. Id.
54. 621 F.2d 787 (5th Cir. July 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 3031 (1981).
55. 625 F.2d 524 (5th Cir. Aug. 1980) (per curiam), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 2336
(1981).
56. Id. at 524; 621 F.2d at 788.
57. 564 F.2d 964 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 941 (1978).
58. 621 F.2d at 789.
59. Id.
60. 625 F.2d at 524.




in United States v. Dixie Carriers, Inc.,6 2 the Fifth Circuit
held that the section of the FWPCA which provides a remedy for
the government to recover oil spill cleanup costs6 is an exclusive
remedy, and thus, the government is precluded from recovering
these costs under other legal theories.6 4 The Government sought to
recover under the FWPCA, the Refuse Act," and common-law the-
ories of public nuisance and maritime tort for negligence.6 The
trial court and the Fifth Circuit found that since the FWPCA al-
lows the government to recover only a limited amount under strict
liability, and to recover an unlimited amount only upon proof of
willful discharge, the statutory scheme would be destroyed if the
government could recover an unlimited amount under the Refuse
Act or common law.
67
C. Water Quality Standards
In Mississippi Commission on Natural Resources v. Costle,68
the issue involved the authority of the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) to promulgate a water quality standard on dissolved
oxygen for the state of Mississippi.69 Under the FWPCA, water
quality standards are first promulgated by the states and then sub-
mitted to the EPA for approval. 0 If a state does not set standards
consistent with the FWPCA or if the EPA determines that another
standard is necessary to meet the requirements of the FWPCA,
then the EPA can promulgate new standards. 7 1 In this case the
EPA disapproved Mississippi's standard for dissolved oxygen and
adopted a new standard. The Mississippi Commission on Natural
Resources filed suit in federal district court seeking injunctive and
declaratory relief. The Commission attacked both the disapproval
62. 627 F.2d 736 (5th Cir. Oct. 1980).
63. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(1) (1976).
64. 627 F.2d at 737.
65. 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1976).
66. 627 F.2d at 737.
67. Id. at 741.
68. 625 F.2d 1269 (5th Cir. Sept. 1980). For a more extensive discussion of the
rulemaking authority issue in Costle, see the survey article on Administrative Law and Pro-
cedure, notes 85-96, and accompanying text.
69. Id. at 1271.
70. Id. at 1272.
71. Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (1976)).
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of the state standard and the promulgation of the EPA standard,
but the trial court refused the injunction. 72 The Fifth Circuit af-
firmed, upholding the EPA's authority to disapprove state water
quality standards that are not consistent with the requirements of
the FWPCA.7' The court further held that the EPA was not arbi-
trary or capricious in promulgating the new standard, because the
standard was reasonable and was set only after consideration of
the local situation .7 Although the EPA failed to promulgate its
new criteria within the statutory time limit, no prejudice was
shown because the FWPCA imposes no sanction for missing the
deadline.75
D. Balancing Test
South Louisiana Environmental Council, Inc. v. Sand 7 dis-
cussed in the section of this Survey concerning the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act, also contained an issue under the FWPCA.
The environmentalists contended that the Corps of Engineers' ap-
proval of the project was invalid under section 404 of the
FWPCA.7 7 That section requires that the benefits of the project
outweigh the damages to the wetland source. The court held that
the Corps of Engineers had made a good-faith effort to satisfy the
requirements of section 404 and, thus, had not violated the
statute.71
E. Constitutionality
The FWPCA imposes a civil penalty of up to $5000 for each
discharge of oil or hazardous substances in harmful quantities into
the navigable waters of the United States.79 Since it provides no
defense, such as those provided against liability for cleanup costs,8"
the statute imposes an absolute-liability standard which obviates
the need for a finding of fault. In United States v. Coastal States
72. 625 F.2d at 1271.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1278.
75. Id.
76. 629 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir. Oct. 1980).
77. Id. at 1017 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1976)).
78. 629 F.2d at 1018.
79. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(6) (Supp. III 1979).
80. See id. § 1321(f).
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Crude Gathering Co.,81 the defendant attacked the constitutional-
ity of assessing a civil fine without fault as being violative of the
due process clause of the fifth amendment. 82 The Fifth Circuit
agreed with the Seventh Circuit's opinion in United States v. Mar-
athon Pipe Line Co.83 and upheld the fine's constitutionality, con-
cluding that the legislative means bore a reasonable relation to a
proper legislative purpose and was neither arbitrary nor discrimi-
natory.84 The purpose of the fine is to place a major part of the
financial burden for achieving and maintaining clean water upon
those who would profit by the use of the navigable waters and who
pollute those waters.8 5 The court found "this shifting of the burden
from the public to the offending users . . . to be a valid exercise of
congressional powers" and affirmed the judgment assessing the
fine.86
F. Conclusion
The Fifth Circuit confronted several diverse issues concerning
the FWPCA during the survey period. The term "third party" was
narrowly defined so as to exclude tug boats towing oil barges. The
court also decided that the section providing a remedy for the gov-
ernment to recover oil spill cleanup costs is the government's ex-
clusive remedy. The court upheld the authority of the EPA to pro-
mulgate water quality standards for the states if the states fail to
meet FWPCA requirements. Finally, the court decided that the
civil penalty for discharge of oil or hazardous substances in harm-
ful quantities did not violate the due process clause of the United
States Constitution.
H. Dennis Kelly
81. 643 F.2d 1125 (5th Cir. Apr. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 136 (1981).
82. Id. at 1127. "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law .... " U.S. CONST. amend. V.
83. 589 F.2d 1305, 1309 (7th Cir. 1978).
84. 643 F.2d at 1127-28. These are the criteria established by the Supreme Court in
Nebbia v. New York, 291- U.S. 502 (1934).
85. 643 F.2d at 1128.
86. Id.
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